We analyze the role of board expertise in environmental issues (measured by the presence of non-executive directors with previous experience in environmental issues, EEDs) and director networks on GHG emissions. Using emission data of FTSE 350 …rms, we show that the presence of EEDs on the board reduces GHG emissions. Also boards with better networked directors have better environmental performance. These associations are robust to alternative explanations -endogenous matching of …rms and directors, general technical expertise of the board, and pro-active stacking in board composition. The results are consistent with the view that director skills and information spillovers through director networks add value.
Introduction
Growing concerns about environmental sustainability has led to a large number of environmental regulations. These regulations aim to cut polluting emissions, phase out ozone-depleting chemicals, or provide cleaner water. Their success is likely to depend on how the corporate sector responds to these initiatives. Firms are under increasing institutional pressure to be environmentally responsible and most countries have now issued codes of good governance on environmental sustainability. Yet, there is little evidence on how …rms internalize these pressures or how corporate governance impacts upon environmental performance of …rms. In this paper, we examine the role of board expertise and director networks in shaping the environmental performance of …rms.
in ‡uence environmental performance? To this end, we use (i) greenhouse gas data (normalized by the permissible thresholds of each type of pollutant) from the European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register, as a measure of a …rm's environmental performance, and (ii) information on the board composition and director networks of FTSE 350 …rms from BoardEx. Our sample comprises an unbalanced panel of 274 …rms for the period 2006-2014. In estimating the e¤ects on environmental performance of board expertise and director networks, it is important to control for potential bias introduced by endogenous appointment of EEDs or better-networked directors in certain …rms. In addition to adjusting for …rm and year …xed e¤ects to mitigate time-invariant omitted variable bias, we control for a range of …rm and industry characteristics.
When investigating whether the presence of EEDs and board level committees on sustainable issues a¤ect environmental performance, we also use two-stage least square estimation to control for bias induced by time-varying unobservables. We instrument the appointment of EEDs with a measure of supply of potential directors with environmental expertise. A higher supply of directors with environmental expertise is likely to lower the cost of appointing such directors on boards, but should not directly in ‡uence an individual …rm's environmental performance.
We …nd an economically meaningful e¤ect of having EEDs on the board, particularly if these directors are members of board-level committees focused on environmental issues. To quantify, when …rms have environmental directors on board, GHG emissions are lower by 0.16 standard deviations; and when …rms have EEDs on environmental committees, GHG emissions are lower by 0.19 standard deviations. These results are robust to di¤erent classi…cations of EEDs and board committees for environmental issues.
To address the second question, we use four centrality measures (viz. degree, closeness, betweenness, and eigenvector) that capture di¤erent aspects of a director's centrality (or importance) in the network formed by shared directorship. We then aggregate each measure at the board level to get a measure of the board centrality and examine its impact on the …rm's GHG emissions. We …nd that better-networked boards have lower GHG emissions. For example, a one standard deviation increase in the degree is associated with 0.20 standard deviation decrease in GHG emissions. However, it is possible that this result is driven by endogenous selection of more skilled directors to …rms with better environmental performance. Masulis and Mobbs (2011) show that endogenous matching on director skills can drive the results of board connections and …nancial performance of …rms.
We perform an array of tests to examine possible endogeneity in board composition and director networks. These tests also allow us to examine whether the negative association of boards networks and GHG emissions is driven by better access to information or better monitoring. First, we restrict the sample to a subset of …rms with unchanged board composition from the previous to the current year. In the absence of new director appointments, the negative association of board networks and GHG emissions still holds. This could be due to better access to network, or better monitoring through changes in …rst-degree connections. Second, we select a subsample of …rms with no change in board composition and no changes in …rst degree connections from the previous to the current year. Again, the statistically signi…cant negative association of board networks with GHG emissions still holds. However, this time, this negative association cannot be explained by a better monitoring of directors on the board of the focal …rm: as …rst and second degree connections do not change, these directors are sitting on the same number of boards. The results suggest that better-networked boards are able to reduce the …rm's GHG emissions through access to better information.
Collectively, the results suggest that board expertise and network have economically meaningful e¤ects upon the environmental performance of …rms. These results add to a few di¤erent strands of economics and …nance literature. boards, and …nd weak evidence that prosecuted …rms have directors with fewer multiple directorships. While these studies provide some insights into how boards a¤ect compliance with environmental legislation, they do not consider individual director characteristics (i.e. expertise or network centrality) that may help the …rm pursue better environmental performance. A key distinction of our paper is that we focus on the director level characteristics, like directors' skills and experience and network connections, that might a¤ect environmental performance.
Furthermore, we add to this literature by using a quantitative and comparable measure of environmental performance, i.e. the level of greenhouse gas emissions. Majority of studies use an aggregated score-based measure (KLD) as a proxy for environmental performance (Di Giuli and Kostovetsky, 2014). Whilst this provides a measure to ordinally rank order …rms, it subsumes the underlying distribution of emissions. Some other studies use negative environmental events like oil-spills, government enforcement actions, lawsuits, etc. (Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996; Karpo¤, Lott, and Rankine, 1999; Konar and Cohen, 2001 ). These measures, whilst useful in studying a particular type of pollution or an event, doesn't provide an objective and comparable measure of …rms'environmental performance. Second, our paper is related to the literature on the advisory role of directors and directors' expertise. The …nancial, legal, industry, and political expertise of directors have been well studied (Güner, Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Goldman, Rocholl, and So, 2009; Dass et al. 2014 ).
These papers provide evidence that …rms can bene…t from the related expertise of directors. On a similar note, Adams and Ferreira (2007) and Masulis and Mobbs (2011) suggest that executive directors can be concerned with monitoring and therefore conceal information. Speci…cally, our paper focuses on directors experience in environmental sustainability matters. We argue that directors with speci…c skills related to environmental management can widen the information set available to the board. The rest of the paper unfolds as follows: in section 2, we describes the data and empirical strategy; section 3 presents the headline results, and section 4 concludes.
Data and Variables
In this section we discuss the data sources, variables construction and sample selection for our empirical tests.
DATA DESCRIPTION
Our sample is taken from listed UK …rms featured in the FTSE 350 index over the period 2006 to 2014. From Datastream we collect information on performance, size, risk in the operating and information environment and industry classi…cations. We augment this with information on individual directors, board composition and board networks of these …rms using BoardEx. Finally, …rm-level environmental emissions data are obtained from the European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register (E-PRTR).
Sample Selection
To be included in our sample, …rms have to feature in the FTSE 350 for at least two consecutive years, have the full set of board characteristics, and relevant …nancial data available. With these constraints, we have an unbalanced panel of 375 …rms with 3328 …rm-year observations. From this sample we drop …rms for which no directors have any network connections. We augment the FTSE 350 sample with network centrality measures of individual directors using information available from BoardEx. To calculate the network centrality of individual directors, we use shared directorships from all quoted boards in Europe. As an additional sample selection criterion, we require that …rms have information on GHG emissions for all years (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) We identify three di¤erent sources of director expertise in environmental issues. First, we use information provided by BoardEx on individual directors' background to control for speci…c experience in environmental sustainability. Following the sample selection protocol used by Berrone and Gomez-Mejia (2009), we classify a director as EED if the job description of a previous role contain keywords like "environment", "ecology", "pollution", "sustainable", etc. 1 Information from committee formations allows us to identify directors with experience on board sub-committees that have an environment/pollution control focus. Finally, we use information on awards for, and recognition of individual directors on environmental issues. 2 It is possible that we do not have complete information on environmental sustainability. related roles, and environment related awards of directors, and this can be a likely source of attenuation bias.
In that regard, our results will be conservative estimates of the impact of these variables on environmental performance.
For the purpose of encoding the environmental experience of directors, we use the subsample of non-executive independent directors: individuals who are less aligned with management have a lower incentive to maximise short term pro…ts and are more likely to in ‡uence the environmental performance (Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Johnson and Greening, 1999). Our measure of director expertise (denoted by EED) is a binary indicator of environmental expertise which is equal to one if any of the three measures discussed above is relevant to that director in a given year.
To give an example, independent non-executive director Patrick Grasby of Drax Group PLC, an electrical power generation company, has previous experience of being on the environmental sustainability committee in OPG Power Ventures group. He is therefore encoded in our sample as an EED. On average a …rm has 1.4 EEDs. We then aggregate this indicator at the board level in the following way: we use a binary indicator (EED dummy) which is equal to one if at least one director on the board is EED.
We then compute the aggregate supply of EEDs in each industry, which is the sum of all directors with some environmental experience and sitting on the board of …rms in that industry in each year. From table III and Figure 1 , the aggregate supply of EEDs has increased over the years from 2010.
We also de…ne an indicator for the presence of an environmental committee on the board.
This measure captures the importance of environmental performance to a …rm: a …rm with a board committee on environmental issues is likely to attach more importance to environmental performance than …rms that do not have such committees.
[ Table II An econometric concern of using environmental experience of directors is the potential bias induced by assortative sorting. Two situations are plausible. First, the demand for EEDs can be higher in …rms (or industries) with higher GHG emissions. Therefore director appointment with environmental expertise is likely to be more prevalent in high-pollution industries. Even though this could induce biased estimates, such negative assortative sorting will only reinforce the importance of director experience in environmental sustainability. Second, and more importantly, it may be possible that the supply of EEDs is constrained for high polluting industries, i.e. out of reputational concerns, EEDs do not accept o¤ers from polluting …rms. If so, the e¤ect of EEDs on GHG emissions will be an artefact of this positive sorting mechanism. In table II, we present the industry breakdown of GHG emissions and aggregate supply of EEDs. There is little evidence of supply constraint of such directors in high-polluting industries like Energy and Industrial production: about 37.25 percent of all EEDs are in the energy and industrial production sectors. The distribution of EEDs partially mitigates concerns about assortative sorting.
Nevertheless, we use a 2SLS approach, where we instrument the appointment of environmental directors on a board by the supply of such directors in the same industry of the …rm The underlying assumption is that …rms appoint directors with environmental expertise from within the same industry to leverage industry-speci…c knowledge. 3 The theoretical underpinning of this approach is that if the supply of EEDs in the industry increases, the cost to …rms for appointing such directors decrease, but it doesn't directly impact upon GHG emissions at the …rm level.
[ Table III near here]
Board Networks
As discussed in section 1, we use information from BoardEx to build the director networks that shared directorship gives rise to. For each year, each individual director is a node, and two directors (or nodes) i and j are connected if they sit on at least one board k in time t.
The connections between individual directors de…ne the network. Mathematically, a network is a square "adjacency" matrix where each cell indicates whether two individual directors are connected. As we use undirected networks whereby the connection between two directors has no directional character (i.e. there is no assumption on the direction of the ‡ow of information between two directors), the adjacency matrix is symmetric. Note that for the same reason as for environmental expertise, we construct our network using information on the independent non-executive directors only.
Our objective is to analyze how the relative importance or centrality of directors in the network a¤ects a …rm's environmental performance. The concept of connections quality or centrality is multidimensional. We focus on four basic dimensions widely used in the network literature (see Jackson, 2010) . The "Degree" or the number of unique connections to other directors gives us the number of channels of information available to a given director. Second, "Closeness" measures how easily a director can access information. It measures of the shortest path between two directors. Third, a director is more central in a network if it connects more directors. This measure, "Betweenness", emphasizes the role of a director as intermediary in a given network. Finally, a director is also well-networked if he is connected to individual directors who are also well-networked. Eigenvector measures director's centrality based on the centrality of his …rst degree connections. Formal de…nitions of these centrality measures can be found in appendix 3.
To obtain a measure of centrality at the board-level, we compute average centrality measures for all the directors on a speci…c board in a given year. In table III, we provide the time series of our centrality measures at the board level. On average an individual …rm is linked to 6 other …rms (Degree) and this remains stable over time. The average closeness and betweenness measures of our sample are also stable over time. Given that the time-series of the aggregate network is stable, our concern that the empirical results could be an artefact of the secular increase in aggregate board network is mitigated. In table II, we present the industry-wise breakdown of the network centrality measures. Industrial production sector has the highest degree and closeness. Eigenvector is the highest for the Energy sector.
There are a few econometric issues with using network centrality measures. First, larger …rms tend to have better-networked boards (Larcker, et al. 2013 ). We purge the …rm size e¤ects by regressing the four centrality measures on the log of …rm size and the square of the log of …rm size, and using the residuals as size-adjusted centrality measures. Further, if board centrality in the network is positively correlated with director quality, then our empirical test will simply capture the e¤ect of better quality directors on GHG emissions. Ideally, an exogeneous shock is required to establish the e¤ect of board network on GHG emissions. However, an exogeneous shock to board network that doesn't otherwise a¤ect GHG emissions is not immediately obvious.
In section 3.2, we discuss our approach to address this concern.
Control Variables
We use a range of …rm and industry-level observables in our baseline estimates to control for confounding factors (i.e. sales, board size, Return on Assets, board independence, etc.). For example, appointment of EEDs and board network may vary by industry competitiveness, risk in …rm's operating environment, and capital structures of the …rm. Therefore in our baseline estimates we control for industry competitiveness by HHI, volatility, and leverage.
Finally, to mitigate concerns that appointment of EEDs are non-random, we present univariate di¤erences for all observable …rm characteristics for …rms with and without EEDs. Firms with EEDs have larger boards, and lower centrality measures, and lower GHG emissions. However, there are no statistically signi…cant di¤erences for any other variables, like R&D expenses.
Univariate results are presented in table IV.
[ Table IV near here]
MEASURING ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE
As a measure of …rms'environmental performance, we use …rms'GHG emission data from the E-PRTR. The E-PRTR provides annual pollution data from more than 30, 000 facilities over the period 2007-2012 across several industrial sectors. It provides data on releases of pollutants to air, water and land as well as o¤-site transfers of waste and of pollutants in waste water from 93 key pollutants, including heavy metals, pesticide, greenhouse gases and dioxins. The main advantage of the register is that data is comparable across countries and pollutants because data collection and reporting is standardised over all pollutants in all countries (see appendix 1 for details).
Pollution data in the E-PRTR is at the facility-level -where a facility is an operation unit of a …rm focused on a narrowly de…ned process like packaging, bottling, etc. To arrive at the …rm-level emission data, we aggregate GHG emissions for all European facilities of a FTSE 350 …rm. This aggregation process requires multi-level matching. EPRTR reports the parent …rm of each facility. We …rst aggregate the information of all facilities that have the same parent …rm. 281 of these parent companies reported by the E-PRTR are not publicly listed …rms themselves, but are wholly owned subsidiaries of listed …rms. We map these subsidiaries to the listed …rms by using information available from Orisis. This matching exercise yields 89 unmatched …rms.
We manually supplement the missing information on parent …rms from publicly available news, and drop from the sample where no information on GHG emissions are available. This leads to omission of 40 …rms.
We validate our matching algorithm by comparing our agglomerated GHG emission with the GHG emission data available from Datastream. We use the ENERDP123 …eld in Datastream that reports the annual total GHG emissions as CO 2 equivalents. By using our agglomeration algorithm, we have improved upon the coverage of Datastream by 32.37%: on average Datastream reports GHG emissions for 207 …rms across the sample period whereas we could calculate GHG emissions of 274 …rms. The correlation of the GHG measure reported by Datastream and our measure is 0.809. Given the wider coverage of our measure, we use our calculation GHG emission data in the baseline regressions, and test for the robustness of our results using the sub-sample of …rms with GHG emission data from Datastream. 4 
Empirical Analysis
In this section we examine the board level characteristics that in ‡uence GHG emissions of …rms.
We study two aspects of the board: the expertise of the directors in environmental sustainability.
issues, and the centrality of directors in the network formed by shared directorships.
BOARD EXPERTISE AND ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE
The central hypothesis is that the presence of EEDs on a board a¤ects the environmental performance of …rms. We present the results in table V with robust standard errors clustered at …rm level. We estimate the following regression equation:
4 GHG emissions data for 2013 and 2014 come from Datastream because these years were not available in the E-PRTR.
where i denotes the …rm and t the year. Variables are de…ned as follows: GHG it is the total GHG emissions of …rm i in year t (the dependent variable), i is the …rm …xed e¤ect, t is the year …xed e¤ect. Firm-…xed e¤ects isolate the e¤ect of board expertise on GHG emissions.
Vector Z it contains various …rm and board level control variables (board size, percentage of non-executive directors, log of total sales, ROA, percentage of institutional shareholding).
The vector Exp it 1 contains the variables of interest related to environmental expertise for …rm i in year t 1: the binary variable EED dummy, which is equal to one if at least one director on the board has some environmental experience, the binary variable Environmental Committee and the interaction term. As denoted by the subscripts, environmental expertise is measured in the year preceding GHG emissions. In establishing an association between board characteristics and environmental performance (and later for network centrality and environmental performance), reverse causal associations whereby an individual directors with a background in environmental sustainability. accepts positions in …rms with better performance need close attention. We try to mitigate this concern in the following ways. First, we lag the independent variables by one year. This identi…es board characteristics that pre-date emissions by at least one year. Second, our baseline estimates include year and …rm …xed e¤ects to control for time-invariant unobservable …rm characteristics that might simultaneously impact upon GHG emissions and the appointment of directors with environmental expertise.
From column 1: the presence of at least one director with environmental experience on the board is associated with lower GHG emissions. In column (2) we add the indicator for the presence of an environmental committee on the board. In this speci…cation, we are trying to isolate the e¤ect of director expertise from the …rm's intrinsic focus on environmental issues.
Both director expertise and the presence of an environmental committee seems to be negatively associated with GHG emissions. Therefore the e¤ect of board expertise on GHG emissions persists after controlling for the importance of environmental performance to the …rm. Finally, in column 3 we add an interaction of board expertise in environmental issues and the presence of an environmental committee. This captures the e¤ect of appointing a director with environmental expertise on environmental committees. In addition to environmental committees and environmental expertise, the interaction is also negatively associated with GHG emissions. In gist, these estimates suggest that board expertise on environmental sustainability. is associated with lower GHG emissions. Firms with enabling mechanisms on the board in the form of board committees focussed on environmental issues gain incremental bene…ts in environmental performance. To quantify: a one standard deviation increase in the proportion of EEDs leads to a 0.16 standard deviations decrease in GHG emissions. 5
[ Table V near here]
A remaining concern is that presence of EEDs on boards can be sticky at the …rm level over time, and appointments of EEDs can be driven by time-varying unobservable characteristics or shocks. For example, it could be possible that appointment of directors with environmental expertise happens around other major changes in the …rms. We …nd in our sample, 77 percent, 72 percent and 70 percent of the …rms that had at least one EED in period t also have them in periods t + 1 ; t + 2 ; t + 3 respectively. Only 13 percent of CEO turnovers, and 7 percent of M&As coincide with the change in …rms status of having an environmental director or not.
This partially addresses the concern that unobserved shocks are changing both GHG emissions To ensure that the baseline results presented above are not driven by endogeneity in environmental performance, we estimate an IV-regression where we use the supply of EEDs as an exogenous source of variation in the …rm-level appointment of such directors. Our instrument is
Ln(industry supply of environmental directors per seat). The supply is measured by identifying
and summing all EEDs in one speci…c industry. This is then scaled by the aggregate board size in the same industry. A greater supply of EEDs is likely to reduce the search cost for such appointments, but there is no obvious direct relationship between this supply measure and the GHG emissions of individual …rms. Moreover, the scaling by aggregate board size implicitly controls for industry e¤ects.
[ 
DIRECTOR NETWORK AND ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE
The second hypothesis we are testing is whether directors' centrality in the network a¤ects environmental performance of …rms. We present the results in table VI with robust standard errors clustered at …rm level. We estimate the following regression equation:
where i denotes the …rm and t the year. Variables are de…ned as follows: GHG it is the total GHG emissions of …rm i in year t, i is the …rm …xed e¤ect, t is the year …xed e¤ect. These …xed e¤ects are included to control for time-invariant unobservable …rm characteristics that might simultaneously impact upon GHG emissions and network centrality measures. Vector Z it contains same …rm and board level control variables as in the previous section.
The variable N etwork it 1 is one of the four centrality measures previously de…ned for …rm i in year t 1: degree, closeness, betweenness and eigenvector. As explained before, we use size-adjusted centrality measures in all our speci…cations, and lag the independent variables by one year. 6 We present the results in table VII, where in column (1) we present the OLS results with Degree as our measure of centrality; in columns (2)- (5) we present the …xed e¤ects estimates with Degree, Closeness, Betweenness, and Eigenvector, respectively. We …nd the …rms with a higher degree have lower GHG emissions, but this association is not statistically signi…cant in the within-…rm estimates. All other measures of centrality are negatively associated with GHG emissions, and such associations are statistically signi…cant. To quantify, one standard deviation increase in degree centrality leads to 0.19 standard deviations decrease in GHG emissions.
There are two possible explanations for how director networks may a¤ect environmental performance: (1) …nancial performance and environmental performance may be correlated. Therefore more successful …rms attract more networked directors; or (2) information spillover from the board networks in ‡uences environmental strategy, and performance. If director quality is positively associated with the size of her network, this may bias our estimates with the centrality measures (Masulis and Mobbs, 2012) . In this section, we perform a series of tests to examine the likelihood that our results are driven by such associations.
[ This allows us to observe variation in the centrality measure through variation in second degree connections. Changes in second degree connections are likely to increase the access to information, but may not have a direct e¤ect on the monitoring of the focal …rm. Therefore we interpret the results of table VIII to be supportive of the view that better-networked boards improve performance in terms of GHG emissions because of better access to information.
ROBUSTNESS
In this section we present the robustness of our results to alternate explanations and potential misclassi…cations. The results are presented in table IX. (2) and (3) of table IX.
Alternate Classi…cations of Environmental Directors

Impact of CEO-EEDs
[ Table IX near here]
Alternate measures of environmental performance
Whilst GHG emission is the most pressing of environmental concerns, there are other measures of environmental performance that needs to be considered. In alternate speci…cations, we test for the robustness of our results using particulate matters, and e-uent release as measures of environmental performance. 7 The results are consistent with our baseline estimates, albeit with smaller sample sizes. These results are unreported in the interests of brevity but are available upon request.
Conclusion
One of the major concerns of our times is to integrate economic and environmental wellbeing.
There is increasing institutional pressure on …rms to be environmentally responsible. We examine two possible channels through which …rms can internalize such institutional costs. Explicitly,
we investigate the advisory function of the board of directors. EEDs have skills that suits them to provide information and strategic advise on matters related to environmental sustainability.
Similarly, boards can leverage knowledge on environmental strategies through shared directorships. For example, better-networked boards can improve a …rm's ability to respond to shocks in environmental technology or anticipate regulatory changes on sustainability. We examine whether board expertise and centrality in the network explain variations in the subsequent environmental performance of …rms. After controlling for endogeneity concerns, we …nd that EEDs have an economically signi…cant impact on GHG emissions: …rms with board expertise in environmental sustainability have lower GHG emissions. We test for alternative explanations, and our results suggest that the e¤ect of EEDs is likely to be a speci…c expertise e¤ect rather than general technical skills. We also …nd that …rms with better-networked directors have lower GHG emissions. Our results also support the view that …rms with better-networked directors are able to improve performance in terms of GHG emissions through a better access to information.
In the light of the above …ndings, an obvious question arises: why don't all …rms appoint EEDs given the growing importance of environmental sustainability? This could be due to a number of reasons. First, appointment of directors with a set of speci…c skills has opportunity costs. Appointing a director with environmental skills might mean keeping out a director with general or other speci…c skills which might be valuable to the …rm. Second, if environmental technology is industry-speci…c then anti-trust laws may prohibit …rms competing in the same product market to have shared directors. This constrains the supply of environmental directors to …rms. Therefore such appointments are likely to be endogenous selections where the bene…ts of such appointments outweighs the cost. Similarly, our …ndings do not suggest that a more connected network can lead to lower GHG emissions for all …rms. Board connections are constrained by both demand and supply side frictions: constraints on number of board positions for a director, number of board seats available, cost of replacement, etc. A director position within the network also depends on director appointment in other …rms, which an individual …rm has little control over. Thus not all …rms can, and will attempt to improve their centrality in the network. Figure 1 This …gure presents the time series of aggregate supply of EEDs and average GHG emissions of our sample …rms. There is no evidence that these two serie -s are co-integrated. We use the supply of EEDs as an instrument for …rm-lev -el appointments of EEDs. old. The reporting thresholds are set up by the European Commission based on their impact on human health and on the environment 8 We therefore normalize the emitted amount according to the reporting threshold and then sum these normalized amounts of pollutant belonging to the same category for each individual facility.
We …nally reshape the dataset to have only one observation per facility per year. Our dataset has now 208,735 lines. Each line contains information on the facility (address, parent company and economic activity code) and the amount of pollutant by category.
In order to test for the robustness of our results, we also construct di¤erent measures by random sampling of these keywords. Data on EEDs are available from the authors'websites on request.
Appendix III: Board Network Algorithm
The concept of centrality is multi-dimensional. In this paper, we focus on the four commonly used measures of centrality (see Jackson, 2010 and Larcker, So, and Wang, 2013): Degree, Eigenvector, Closeness and Betweenness. We compute these measures for each director in the network formed by shared directorship. To aggregate these measures at the board level, we compute the average centrality measures of the directors of the board. We discuss the relevance of each of these measures below:
1. Degree
The simplest centrality measure is the count of the number of connections. The degree is similar to the concept of board interlock used in the literature about the impact of board governance. A higher degree re ‡ects more pathways to access to information, and expertise.
The degree centrality varies over time due to entry and exit of directors, and is normalised by n 1, n where is the number of directors in the network.
d ij is equal to 1 if directors i and j sit on the same board and 0 otherwise.
Eigenvector
It can be argued that a director is more in ‡uential when his individual connections are also well-networked. Unlike degree, which weights every link equally, the eigenvector weights links according to their eigenvector values. A nodes'eigenvector is proportional to the sum of the eigenvector values of all nodes directly connected to it. It is useful in determining who is connected to the most connected nodes. The eigenvector of a node is de…ned as
where is the eigenvalue. In our context, it is important to measure how central a director is in terms of its own degree but it it also important to take into account the degrees of the directors he is connected to. If director i is connected to director j, who is very well connected (i.e. has a high degree), then director i has a greater opportunity to get access to information or in ‡uence the rest of network.
Closeness
This measures the ease to reach other nodes or how long it will take to spread information from one director to all other directors sequentially.
Where l ij is the distance between directors i and j.In our network, a high closeness indicates a director who is close to others and can therefore quickly interact and communicate with them without going through many intermediaries. High closeness makes information transmission quicker.
Betweenness
The betweenness of a node is a measure of its role as an intermediary. Formally, node i betweenness is the sum of proportions for all pairs of nodes j and k in which node i is on the shortest path between j and k: It is normalized by the maximum possible betweenness for the network with n nodes. Mathematically, It is de…ned as
Betweenness i = X j;k6 =i P i (j; k)=P (j; k) (n 1)(n 2)=2
where P (j; k) is the number of shortest paths between j and k and P i (j; k) is the number of shortest paths between j and k that goes through i. Directors with high betweenness are on the path of large number of information ‡ows and as such, able to in ‡uence a large number of directors as well as be able to collect information quickly from many sources.
